to buy from factories that subcontract or seem unlikely to abide by labor regulations. We use six rounds of the Bangladesh Labor Force Survey, spanning from 2003 to 2016, and employ a differencein-difference estimation strategy that compares workers in the garment sector to workers in other manufacturing industries. Each survey was collected in all four quarters of the year, allowing us to separately examine short-term effects (in the remainder of 2013) and longer-term effects (in 2015 and 2016) . We show that treatment effects are very similar when we use alternative control groups or a synthetic control instead of other manufacturing industries.
We find that, despite a minimum-wage increase, average hourly wages have fallen for female garment workers a few years after the reforms. In contrast, we report no significant effect for male workers. When we look at the time path of wage effects, we find that wage decreases compound over time; women's hourly wage had significantly fallen by 2015 and 2016. Quantile regressions confirm that while low earners indeed appear to have benefited from the reforms, consistent with a role for the minimum wage increase, higher wage earners were particularly adversely impacted.
We go on to examine measures of job security, non-wage benefits, and health/safety. Workers were 14 percentage points less likely to have a written contract after Rana Plaza. This suggests additional welfare losses for workers, as hypothetical choice experiments have indicated that job stability is the most valued aspect of formal work among Bangladeshi workers (Mahmud et al., 2019) . At the same time, some measures of working conditions increased post Rana Plaza; workers were 5.0 percentage points more likely to have paid sick leave, and female workers were 17 percentage points less likely to report abusive behavior, and a marginal statistically significant decrease of 11 percentage points in dangerous conditions. We explore several potential explanations for why women in particular saw large wage decreases as a result of Rana Plaza. We first show that it appears to be gender per se, rather than some observable characteristic correlated with gender, that drives the decrease in women's wages: interacting the treatment with age, education, and number of children in a respondent's household does little to change the treatment effect on women. Instead, we provide suggestive evidence that, as increased costs decreased demand for labor, women's labor supply is more inelastic, so they stay in the industry even with lower wages. This phenomenon is potentially particularly strong in Bangladesh, where women historically have not worked outside the home, and can help explain the divergence between our results and several studies that find that women and men were equally hit during macroeconomic shocks (Smith et al. 2002; Hallward-Driemeier, Rijkers and Waxman 2011; Zhi et al. 2013 ).
These changes affect many workers and their families, given that the RMG sector in Bangladesh is widely considered to be a key contributor to the country's robust economic growth, poverty reduction, and women's empowerment. The sector's share of total exports increased from 53 percent in 1995 to more than 80 percent in 2015, with its exports reaching about USD 24.5 billion (Farole et al., 2017) . The export share of GDP tripled between 2003 and 2015, and Bangladesh is now the world's second largest garment exporter after China. The sector provides jobs and earnings opportunities to over 4 million low and semi-skilled workers, and represents over 40 percent of the total industrial employment in the country. Moreover, the large expansion of the garment industry has provided employment opportunities to women, changing their lives and decisions on schooling, marriage, and childbearing (Heath and Mobarak, 2015) .
Our results join a literature that points out that regulation intended to help workers may have unintended negative consequences. For instance, Besley and Burgess (2004) find that pro-worker labor regulations in India decreased productivity and ultimately increased urban poverty. Botero et al. (2004) show similar results hold in a sample of 85 countries; heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower employment rates. Parker, Foltz and Elsea (2016) find that policies targeting human rights abuses can have similar effects: legislation aimed at stopping the export of conflict minerals hurt infant health in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While these results are plausibly driven by employers' response to increased labor costs, Adhvaryu, Nyshadham and Xu (2018) and Boudreau (2019) highlight a complementary mechanism in Indian and Bangladeshi garment factories, respectively. These papers argue that reforms that raise workers' expectations for job quality can decrease job satisfaction if these expectations are not met.
If it is effective, scrutiny from retailers and other watchdogs may have similar effects as formal regulation, and Harrison and Scorse (2010) find that international attention to the wages and working conditions in textiles and footwear factories in Indonesia in the 1990s raised wages. Amengual and Distelhorst (2019) find that a management change at Gap Inc. increased labor compliance in sourcing factories. Our results suggest that international pressure post Rana Plaza, which was focused on working conditions, was also successful in improving working conditions, but factories may do so at the expense of employees' wages.
Our paper also joins a large literature on the relationship between wages and working conditions. Standard theories of compensating differentials posit that firms choose wages and working conditions to equalize the marginal utility of an additional dollar investment in wages versus working conditions for the marginal worker. We join Summers (1989) and Mitchell (1990) in emphasizing that wages fall when firms are compelled by external forces to improve their working conditions. Finally, our work is also related to a literature in trade and development on the ways in which destination countries affect workers in export industries in low-income countries. The existence of a wage premium for working in an export factory suggests that access to international markets helps workers in low income countries, as their firms make increased profits from selling to wealthier consumers in high-income countries (Verhoogen, 2008 , Frías, Kaplan and Verhoogen, 2009 , Amiti and Davis, 2011 . The sudden opportunity to export that came with Myanmar's trade liberalization also improved working conditions (Tanaka, 2017) . However, exposure to trade can also hurt workers in import-competing industries, and Topalova (2010) and Kovak (2013) find evidence that reductions in trade barriers increased poverty in India and Brazil, respectively. Other work finds that consumer sentiment may also matter. Dragusanu and Nunn (2018) find that fair trade certification in Costa Rica helps coffee farmers, though there are distributional consequences: unskilled farmers are unaffected. Our quantile regressions show that distributional effects go in the opposite direction in our study -higher wage workers appear to lose more -suggesting that the effects of international pressure may reach lower paid workers in ways that certification may not, if it results in minimum wage increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the context of the post-Rana Plaza reforms as well as the policy changes that affected the RMG sector following the collapse. In section 3, we describe our data and our identification strategy. Section 4 discusses our main results.
Section 5 discusses the identifying assumptions and tests the robustness of the results to alternative control groups. In section 6, we examine hypotheses for why we find differentially stronger wage effects on women. Section 7 concludes.
Context

Employment in the Garment Sector
The garment sector currently employs approximately 4 million workers in Bangladesh in over 5,000 factories, and accounts for over 40 percent of the country's total industrial employment (Farole et al., 2017) . Employment in the RMG sector has grown at an explosive yearly rate of 15.5 percent since its inception in the early 1980s, as indicated by data from the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers Exporting Association (BGMEA) in figure 1. This growth has been fueled by migration from rural areas, whose lack of information appears to contribute to poor working conditions (Boudreau, Heath and McCormick, 2017) . Workers are fairly mobile; by 12 months after the time of hiring, for instance, only 62 percent of all hired workers who are still working in the garment industry remain in their original factory (Heath, 2018).
Minimum Wage Increase
The minimum wage is set at the industry level in Bangladesh, with no formal overall minimum wage. The garment industry is one of the few sectors that has statutory minimum wages; these have been in place since 1985. One minimum is set for each of the seven grade levels, corresponding to different levels of skills and experience in the industry. After subsequent periodic revisions to reflect inflation and cost of living, it was set at BDT 3,000 (USD 38) a month as of 2010 for low-skilled workers. After the Rana Plaza collapse, domestic and international communities lobbied to raise the wage, seeking a "living wage" of BDT 9,500 (USD 120). Factory owners argued that such a large increase would hamper competitiveness, and in December 2013, the sector's minimum wage was raised, but only to a compromise of BDT 5,300 (USD 68) a month for low-skilled workers. 1 Figure 2 provides a histogram of the monthly wage of workers in the RMG sector in 2013 quarter 1 (before the Rana Plaza collapse) and 2015 (after the minimum increase had been in effect for over a year) using the Bangladeshi Labor Force Survey data described in section 3.1. While there is some evidence of lumping at the minimum wage -only 1.7 percent of workers earn between BDT 4,000 and BDT 5,000 in 2015, compared to the 9.3 percent of workers who earn between BDT 5,000 and BDT 6,000 -the mode is considerably higher: the most common wage interval is between BDT 1 In December 2018, after the period studied by this paper, the minimum wage was further raised to BDT 8,000. 8,000 and BDT 9,000, earned by 26 percent of workers.
Safety Standards in the RMG Sector, before and after Rana Plaza
Before the Rana Plaza collapse, workers had protested, and some safety measures had been put in place, such as the Fire Prevention and Fire Fighting Law of 2003, the Fatal Accidents Act of 1855, the Bangladesh National Building Code of 2006, and the Labour Act of 2006. However, the effectiveness of these acts was limited; they were overall vague, narrowly defined, and lacked focus (Rahman and Moazzem, 2017) . Moreover, authorities lacked technical expertise, and enforcement was weak. For instance, factory visits were pre-announced, and factories with violations found only needed to be revisited within a span of three years.
The fast growth of the industry led large factories to subcontract to small factories in order to remain cost competitive and meet deadlines. While the principal factories are typically highly compliant to worker and safety norms/codes, their subcontractor factories are small, often huddled into buildings that are not designed for industrial purposes, but house five or more small factories. 2
The general consensus among industry experts is thus that working conditions in these factories are worse than those in the principal factories that sell to retailers (Rahman and Moazzem 2017; Naved et al. 2018) .
Following the Rana Plaza incident, the representatives of the Government of Bangladesh, the European Union (EU) represented by the European Commission, and the International Labour Organization (ILO) supported the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact to promote improved labor standards and responsible business conduct in the RMG sector in Bangladesh. Representatives from industry (including brands, retailers and small and medium enterprises), employers, trade unions and other key stakeholders also supported the initiative. They put in place the National Tripartite Action Plan on Fire Safety and Structural Integrity, which consisted of a set of detailed measures to improve safety in RMG factories.
In parallel, although major retailers initially discussed a single coordinated industry response, two different industry agreements emerged. European buyers joined to create the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (AFBSB), and a group of American buyers joined to create the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (ABWS) in 2013. Both initiatives were voluntary measures meant to assess RMG factories' compliance to building and fire safety. The Accord is a legallybinding agreement that commits signatories to a five-year program of safety audits and remediation investments in their Bangladeshi supplier bases. The Alliance positioned has similar stated goals as the Accord but with more limited binding commitments, including for financing remediation.
As a result of these measures, the majority of export oriented RMG factories have been assessed and those that did not qualify have been flagged for remediation. While the Accord and Alliance have provided some help with remediation financing, the reforms prescribed by the Accord and Alliance have been primarily financed by the factories themselves, under buyer pressure. This led to an important rise in compliance related expenditures, and therefore to an increase in the cost of doing business for RMG entrepreneurs. This increase in expenses was simultaneous to an increased pressure from buyers for garment factories to bring down their prices. Some had to reduce their production capacity to make up for additional expenditures on compliance requirements, while some could simply not cope with the additional expenses, which led to business closures. Therefore, the sustainability of such reforms is doubted by industry experts.
Empirical Strategy
Data
We use the Labor Force Surveys (LFS) conducted in 2003, 2005, 2010, 2013, 2015, and 2016 by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. The Bangladesh LFS was designed to be representative at the national level -for both rural and urban areas -as well as for each of Bangladesh's seven divisions.
Each working age individual from the selected households is interviewed for detailed labor market outcomes including labor market status, type of employment, monthly wages for those that are paid employees, as well as a detailed occupation and sector of activity at the four-digit level. The sample sizes are large, with over 100,000 individuals of working age (15 to 64) interviewed in years prior to 2015, and above 300,000 in 2015 and 2016. The 2003-2013 surveys took place over the course of a year, while the 2015 and 2016 surveys represented four distinct quarterly surveys that we merged together. Thus, any seasonality in wages (bonuses or raises) should be averaged out over the course of each survey. In each survey round, workers were asked the number of hours they had worked over the past seven days. By contrast, the measures of earnings varied from year to year, so to construct our measure of hourly wages:
• In 2003, workers were asked monthly earnings from their main activity in the past year. We calculate average hourly earnings by dividing this amount by the hours worked in the past week multiplied by 4.33 (the average number of weeks in a month, across the year).
• In 2005, 2010 and 2013, workers were asked about wages from the previous week in their primary job, so we divide this by the hours worked in the past week.
• In 2015 and 2016, workers were asked take home income for the past one month (both cash and in-kind). We calculate average hourly earnings by dividing this amount by the hours worked in the past week multiplied by 4.33.
In each round, earnings were asked to paid employees: both regular wage workers and well as casual/piece rate workers. While self-employed workers were asked about their earnings prior to 2013, for consistency over our period of study, we restrict our sample to paid employees.
There may be differences in the wages calculated across the different survey rounds. Most obviously, wages paid in 2015 and 2016 may be higher because they reflect in-kind payment as well.
The fact that 2003 asked about monthly earnings over the past year presumably reduces variance between workers, if workers take the average of their income over the past year. Similarly, the average weekly pay over the past month in 2015 and 2016 could display lower variance than in rounds 2005-2013, when workers reported weekly pay directly. However, these differences would be absorbed in the year fixed effects in the regression analysis, and would not be a leading concern unless they systematically vary between garment and non-garment sectors, conditional on the control variables in our main specification (equation 1), which allows for effects like lower in-kind payment to educated workers.
The data also contain several measures of non-wage benefits and other aspects of job quality.
Some of these variables are only available in later rounds, as summarized in the Table A3 gives the frequency of specific abuses and dangerous conditions.
Timing of the Treatment
The collapse of Rana Plaza occurred on April 24, 2013. Rescue efforts continued until May 13, including the high profile rescue of a woman on May 10. Workers began to riot, starting two days after the collapse, and were joined the next day by left-leaning political parties, including the Bangladesh National Party, demanding the arrest of those whose negligence they believed contributed to the collapse and an independent commission to identify safety threats. Protests continued off and on for many months.
Response from retailers also began shortly after the collapse. Specifically, retailers and NGO's met one week after the collapse and created the Accord on Factory and Building Safety. The
Alliance came in place in July 2013. Activists also pushed retailers in the months following the collapse, with some calling for boycotts, but others calling for brands to stay and "clean up the industry" (Judy Gearheart, executive director of the International Labor Rights Forum on April 29, 2013).
Overall, wage and working conditions responses to the Rana Plaza incident and subsequent reforms likely unfolded gradually across the months following the incident. Some responses -such as compositional changes in the industry due to factory shutdowns -could have taken even longer.
We consider the first quarter of 2013 to be pre-treatment, drop the second quarter (as it is a mix of pre-treatment survey periods and those surveyed in the immediate aftermath), and consider the third and fourth quarters to be post-treatment. Thus, while our baseline specification averages the effects on workers surveyed from 5 weeks to 2.5 years after the Rana plaza collapse, we also run specifications where we explicitly consider treatment effect heterogeneity by time since the collapse.
Identification Strategy
Our treatment group consists primarily of workers employed in the garment industry according to the ISIC-3 classification, as the post-Rana reforms were targeted to that specific industry. However, we also include textile workers in the treatment group of our baseline estimation, because the textile industry is closely tied to the garment industry in the value chain and thus reforms that affect the garment industry may also have impacted the textile industry. Moreover, given that the activities of the textile and garment industries are very similar, it is possible that some garment workers were reported as textile workers and vice versa during survey data collection.
As a control group for treated garment sector workers, we first consider other workers in manufacturing, defined by ISIC-3 four digit industry codes between 1500 and 3720. Table A2 gives a list of these industries, which primarily include food products (rice milling, sugar confectionery, etc.) and wooden furniture and handicrafts. The summary statistics for the treatment and control groups are reported in table 1. 3 The groups are not perfectly similar in levels, motivating our exploration of parallel trends and consideration of alternate control groups in section 5. For instance, workers in other manufacturing are older, less educated, and less likely to be located in Dhaka than garment sector workers. Garment sectors workers also earn more and are more likely to be in factories.
Then, for an outcome Y for worker i in geographic area j (specifically, the division) at time t,
we estimate the following equation: Table A1 provides summary statistics for the alternate control groups that we consider in section 5.
The estimated β 2 gives the net causal effect of the post-Rana Plaza reforms on the outcome of garment workers, under the assumption of parallel trends between the garment sector and other manufacturing. We include gender interacted with both division by year fixed effects and year fixed effects interacted with a vector of control variables X ijt : namely age, education, and an urban dummy. These controls flexibly account for changes in labor outcomes over time that may vary by location or a worker's human capital, and possibly differentially so by gender. We discuss further threats to identification in section 5, including a test for parallel trends and discussion of the possibility that the control group was indirectly treated by the RMG reforms. Table 2 reports the results of our difference-in-difference estimation on workers' outcomes. We first examine hourly wages. Estimates reported in column 1 show that, on average, the post-Rana Plaza reforms reduced workers' wages by 8.4 percent. This estimated effect is approximately the same order of magnitude as the positive coefficient on the main effect of working in the garment industry (7.9 percent), suggesting that the prior wage premium for working in the garment industry went away after Rana Plaza. This average wage decrease comes even in light of an increase in the minimum wage for wage observations taken after 2013, suggesting the increase in labor costs was even more important.
Results
Treatment Effects on Wages
Estimates in columns 2 and 3 highlight striking differences in the wage impact of the reforms by gender and time horizon. Column 2 indicates that while males on average lost 4.9 percent of their wages after Rana Plaza, the wages of female garment workers fell by 20 percent. This adverse effect on female workers' wages appears to have further increased several years after the reforms. Column of a differential time pattern after Rana Plaza. In section 6, we explore different reasons for the larger wage loss among women and find suggestive evidence in support of a model in which women -who have worse outside options -stay in the garment industry, even after a shift in labor demand reduces wages.
To shed light on potential mechanisms that could drive the wage decline, we allow estimate quantile regressions that allow for heterogenous effects along the wage distribution. These results, reports the additional effect of the reforms by quintile for female workers. The pattern is the same as for the full sample, suggesting that the negative effect on high earners is even stronger in the female sample.
This finding is compatible with the existence of two opposite effects of the post-Rana Plaza reforms on wages, whose magnitude depends on workers' location along the wage distribution.
The minimum wage increase would have a positive effect on wages of low-paid workers for which the minimum wage is binding. On the other hand, an effect of the opposite sign would appear if employers respond to increased costs by cutting labor costs among workers for which the minimum wage is not binding. The magnitude of this negative wage effect would increase along the wage distribution, as employers have more room to cut wages the further away the workers are from the new minimum wage. The existence of these two opposite effects is compatible with the net effects of the post-Rana Plaza on wages progressively declining and becoming increasingly negative along the wage distribution.
Treatment Effects on Non-pecuniary Aspects of Job Quality
Columns 4 to 6 of in key outcomes in the absence of the treatment. We use other manufacturing as our preferred control group, under the assumption that other manufacturing industries have labor forces whose outside options evolve similarly over time and face similar macroeconomic shocks. We begin by assessing whether trends are parallel between the garment sector and control group leading up to the reform.
Specifically, we examine a Garment dummy interacted with year dummies over pretreatment time periods (2003, 2005, 2010 and 2013 quarter 1), to test whether there is a non-linear pretreatment trend in garment areas. We estimate the following equation separately for men and women:
We then test whether the estimatedβ t coefficients are jointly significant, which would indicate that the difference between the garment sector and other industries varies from period to period in the pre-treatment period. The estimation results are given in table 3 and visually in figure   4 . The primary control group of manufacturing, while not perfect, appears parallel in raw wages.
However, since the trends do diverge to some extent when we look at wages conditional on the control variables in equation 1 -as evidenced by the rejection of joint insignificance of the year dummies for women in column 1 -we consider several alternate control groups. First, we broaden the control group to include all non-agricultural wage workers and then all wage workers. While we still reject joint insignificance of the year dummies for both cases (columns 2 and 3), figure 4 illustrates that the differential trend is not the same as with all manufacturing. That is, while each control group is imperfect, they are imperfect in different ways, and so we interpret similar estimates in these groups as some evidence that our treatment effect is not driven by differential trend in the garment industry relative to one given control group.
Second, we provide synthetic control estimates (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) . Because outside the garment industry, men and women do very different kinds of jobs, we select separate control groups for men and women. To avoid concerns about overfitting (given that we only have four pre-treatment time periods), we restrict our donor pool for each gender to industries with at least 500 pre-treatment observations of that gender. Table A4 shows the industries selected. on women's wages in 2013 appears somewhat sensitive to specification, the wage decline for women by 2015 and 2016 is quite robust to specification.
Other Threats to Identification
Even if trends are parallel leading up to Rana Plaza -as occurs by construction for the synthetic control group shown in tables 3 and 4 -a violation of the parallel trend assumption required for difference-in-difference would occur if the control group was indirectly affected by the treatment.
For instance, other similar industries could be hurt if the reputation of all Bangladeshi industries -not just the garment sector -were hurt, and thus firms in these other industries were also prompted to improve working conditions. While we cannot totally rule out these effects, we know of no anecdotal evidence that other industries were affected by the Rana Plaza collapse. The garment industry is very high-profile, and discussion tends to center on it per se.
Alternatively, if workers pushed out of the garment industry joined other industries, outcomes in these hours could be affected by an outward shift in labor supply. We examine the potential for such shifts in figure 5. It shows a short-term dip in garment sector employment, which appears to dissipate by 2015. Thus, we conclude that there were not large overall extensive margin effects.
Even if there are not large effects on the size of the garment sector workforce, there could be a compositional change in the workers that remain, post Rana Plaza. We investigate the potential for this latter hypothesis by examining compositional changes along three key dimensions, as displayed in table 5: workers' years of education, age and location in an urban or rural area, to potentially account for rural to urban migration that may have occurred our period of study. We examine these compositional effects separately by gender (Panel A and B) as well as in the full sample (Panel C).
In the full sample, we also check for changes in gender composition of the workforce. We find no evidence of changes in education or share urban post Rana-Plaza. We do find evidence that workers get younger, driven by males, who are on average 1.5 years younger post Rana Plaza. Moreover, the labor force becomes 3.3 percentage points more female post Rana Plaza, although the increase is not statistically significant at conventional levels (P = 0.134). We will return to the evidence on gender in section 6.2, when we explore how potential differential labor supply elasticities between men and women could explain differential wage effects. Overall, it does appear that there is some potential for compositional changes to underly the estimated effects from equation 1, in addition to causal impacts on a fixed type of worker. Moreover, if workers who left garments went to industries in the control group, it is possible the composition of the control group is affected as well.
Finally, one may be concerned that the policy changes that took place due to Rana Plaza might be contemporaneous to other shocks affecting the garment industry, which could also affect workers' outcomes. For example, the garment sector could have also been affected by increased global competition or other shifts in the global economy that may have taken place over the same period. While we include fixed effects interacted with gender and other control variables to capture macroeconomic shocks, it is still possible that the macroeconomic variables affect the garment industry, say because it more extensively exports, as discussed in section 2. To investigate this possibility, we look at the evolution of exports from Bangladesh over time, as shown in figure   6 . Time series do not show a noticeable break in export trends around the Rana Plaza event, alleviating concerns that our estimated treatment effects may capture the confounding influence of contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks.
Why Did Female Wages Fall?
A common and striking theme through the main specification and the robustness checks in the previous section is that the post-Rana Plaza responses reduced female workers' wages, especially in 2015 and 2016. In this section, we delve deeper into potential reasons why the wages of female workers were more disproportionately affected by such reforms. We begin by looking for evidence that it is not gender per se that drives the disproportionate effect on women, but rather, observable characteristics correlated with gender. Given that we find little evidence that observable characteristics of women explain the larger decrease in wages that they face, we turn to explanations that highlight a more direct role of gender in determining employers' responses to the collapse.
Observable Characteristics Correlated with Gender
Gender might be correlated with other observable characteristics of garment workers or job types that may be driving heterogeneous responses to the reforms. For instance, if the post-Rana Plaza reforms had an impact mostly on less educated workers and female workers have less education than male workers, the disproportionate gender impact may be due to firm size rather than gender itself. This is possible, given that table 1 shows some differences between male and female garment workers, including education.
To test the extent to which observable characteristics correlated with gender can explain the stronger wage effects on women, we add to our baseline regression a set of interactions between the treatment of interest and a set of observable characteristics of workers that may be correlated with gender: indicators for above median level of schooling (seven years) of workers in our sample, below median age, the number of children in the household, living in Dhaka division and living in an urban area. We first add the interaction of each variable with treatment and assess the extent to which these additional covariates diminish the estimated treatment effect on women. We also include an interaction of the variable with a female dummy to assess whether there is a differential effect on women of that variable. We also include interactions with a large firm dummy, defined by a firm size of over 10 workers. 4 While working in a large firm may very well be endogenous to the Rana Plaza reforms -so that it should not be read as the effect of Rana Plaza among workers pre-determined to be in a large firm -we nonetheless think that it is a useful descriptive way to assess the set of firms that drive the treatment effects on wages, and how these firms may vary between male and female workers.
The results are displayed in table 6. Panel A shows that the larger wage effects among women do not seem to be driven by their observable characteristics of women. The effects of the post-Rana Plaza reforms on garment wages remains negative and statistically significant, and of a similar magnitude in all specifications. There is evidence that younger workers of both genders are less hurt by the responses; their wages are 9.3 percent higher after Rana Plaza than workers above age 25. This is consistent with the quantile regression results in figure 3 that show that higher-paid workers have been more adversely impacted than lower-paid workers.
Panel B of table 6 examines location and firm size. There is some evidence that the post-Rana Plaza reduction in women's wages has been mostly driven by workers in the Dhaka division.
Namely, a female worker in Dhaka suffered an average 27 percent wage drop after Rana Plaza, while a female worker outside Dhaka suffered a 12 percent decrease (P = 0.130). One potential explanation for this finding could be that enforcement and inspection efforts following the post-Rana Plaza reforms have been disproportionately concentrated in Dhaka, where the main export-oriented factories are located. In this case, one would expect a disproportionate increase in costs associated with compliance with the new regulations for firms located in the area. The point estimate on the female treatment effect interacted with an urban location is also negative, though statistically insignificant.
There is similarly evidence in column 6 that women in large firms are less affected by Rana Plaza; their wages fall by 8.8 percent less than women in small firms. This suggests that larger firms, despite pressure for labor inspection and international scrutiny, were better able to cope with financial burden and plausibly are more likely to abide by the minimum wage regulations. To the contrary, small firms appear to bear the brunt of burden of the reforms and to pass on the increasing costs on workers' wages, especially women.
Direct Effects of Gender
Rana plaza likely decreased demand for labor in the garment industry by increasing the cost of each worker hired, now that the factory is compelled to provide more benefits and better working conditions. Additionally, the diminished reputation of clothes sourced from Bangladesh may have also decreased demand for attire purchased there, as retailers likely substituted toward countries with better safety records. Even though this decrease applied to all workers, it could particularly affect women if their labor supply is plausibly more inelastic than that of male workers, and thus, their wages would likely fall more. This hypothesis is consistent with recent evidence from Menzel and Woodruff (2019), who find that the wage gap between male and female garment workers is driven by lower mobility within the garment sector; similar frictions might also impede their job opportunities in other sectors.
One possible driver of a more inelastic labor supply among women in the garment industry is the lack of employment opportunities for women outside this industry. Descriptive statistics in our sample indeed show a higher concentration of female manufacturing workers in the garment industry compared to males. While about 48 percent of male workers employed in manufacturing are in the garment industry, over 78 percent of female manufacturing workers are employed in the garment sector. This suggests the existence of barriers to working outside the garment industry among women. As a result, female workers may not respond to negative shocks affecting the garment industry to the same extent as male workers, who would switch to a more attractive job in a different sector.
Alternatively, the demand for female labor could have differentially fallen. Section 4.2 found evidence of increased sick leaves, which are likely associated with disproportionately greater costs of female labor (Gruber 1994; Ruhm 1998) . While employers in a competitive labor market would ideally prefer to pass on the extra costs only to the women that they know will take advantage of these benefits, they likely cannot tell upon wage-setting which women will do so. So, instead, they statistically discriminate against all women and lower their wages accordingly.
While both an overall demand decrease in an environment in which female labor is more inelastic than males and a differential increase in the cost of women's labor can explain why women's wages fell more than men's, these theories differ in their prediction on the effect of Rana Plaza on the gender composition of the labor force. In particular, if women's labor supply is more inelastic than men's, then more of them will stay in the labor force after the demand decrease. By contrast, a differential decrease in demand for women's labor would increase the share of males among the workforce. Table 5 thus provides suggestive evidence differentiating these theories. The labor force became 3.3 percentage points disproportionately more female after Rana Plaza, though the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels (P = 0.134). Thus, we view this result as suggestive evidence that the wage results are consistent with the theory that women are more likely to stay in the labor force, even in the face of reduced labor demand.
Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of the post-Rana Plaza reforms on labor market outcomes of garment workers compared to other manufacturing sector workers. We find that increased international scrutiny has improved some measures of working conditions as they intended to, such as paid sick leave or safety at work.
We also report, however, that garment workers have been negatively impacted by the reforms along other important dimensions. First, despite an increase in the minimum wage, the post-Rana Plaza reforms negatively affected female workers' hourly earnings a couple of years after the reform.
Given minimal changes in hours of work, this decrease translates into reduced take-home earnings.
One possible explanation for this is that employers compensated for increasing safety compliance costs by lowering the wages of the workers for whom the new minimum wage was not binding.
Female workers bore the brunt of the reduction in wage rates due to the post-Rana Plaza reforms.
Except for a small share of low-earning young females, who appear to have been protected by the minimum wage policy, female workers in the rest of the wage distribution experienced wage decreases. Such negative impacts were driven by small firms especially in Dhaka, on which pressures to improve working conditions and thus costs associated with them were likely high.
Additionally, the reforms appear to have significantly reduced job security among garment workers. This indicates that employers introduced more flexibility in hiring and firing decisions, as a response of increasing non-labor costs and a more uncertain economic environment induced by the reforms.
Taken together, our results suggest that the push to improve working conditions after Rana Plaza may have brought unintended consequences, which were particularly felt by female workers.
Our findings suggest that policy-makers should take into account such consequences when implementing reforms, and consider pairing them with policies that mitigate potential adverse effects on workers' job security and wages. Gar Other F M Abusive behavior constantly shouted/insulted 0.126 0.118 0.158 0.100 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 beaten /physically hurt 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.213 0.327 0.004 sexually abused 0.047 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.758 others 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.020 0.001 0.008 0.001
Dangerous conditions dust, fumes,noise or vibration 0.185 0.172 0.234 0.185 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.008 fire, gas, flames 0.007 0.019 0.049 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 extreme cold or heat 0.029 0.040 0.058 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 dangerous tools 0.153 0.137 0.178 0.187 0.001 0.266 0.004 0.000 work underground or at heights 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.028 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 work in water/pond/river 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.827 0.000 0.172 0.000 workplace too dark or confined 0.020 0.021 0.031 0.028 0.566 0.409 0.002 0.001 chemicals/explosives 0.005 0.013 0.036 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 other things (specify) 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 N 10,386 11,363 2229 11,527
All variables available only 2013 onwards. 
